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Electronic Devices at the Border: The Next Frontier of
Canadian Search and Seizure Law?
Robert J. Currie*
Abstract
Over the last several years the Supreme Court of Canada has developed its
jurisprudence regarding the search and seizure of electronic devices, applying
section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in such a way as to
assert and protect a significant amount of privacy in the devices and their data.
Recent cases regarding the search of devices at Canada’s borders, however, do not
reflect this case law. This is a situation made all the more complex by the generally
attenuated expectation of privacy in the border context, and is worthy of inquiry.
Using a pending border case as a leaping-off point, this paper explores how section
8 should be applied to searches of electronic devices in the possession of people
entering Canada, concluding that an appropriate analysis would impose more
robust privacy protection than has been seen to date. It also examines the issue of
whether individuals can be compelled to unlock devices or surrender passwords
during border searches.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2015, a Quebec resident named Alain Philippon was returning
from a trip to the Dominican Republic and arrived in the Halifax airport. He was
stopped by Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officials for what appears
to have been ‘‘secondary inspection.” This involved a search of material he had
with him, including his cellphone. The official who stopped him demanded that
he provide the phone’s password, but Philippon refused to provide it. He was
arrested and charged under section 153.1(b) of the Customs Act,1 which provides:
153.1 No person shall, physically or otherwise, do or attempt to do any
of the following:
. . .
* Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University (robert.currie@dal.ca). This
paper was originally presented at the 29th Annual Conference of the International
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, on 28 June 2016, and I am grateful for
discussion and feedback that emerged. Thanks are also due to my colleague, Steve
Coughlan, and to Stephen Aylward and Michael Osborne for their comments, and to
Sophie DeViller for excellent research assistance and astute analysis. In light of my
editorial role in this publication, it should be stated that this article was subjected to
expert peer review.
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp) [hereinafter Customs Act or Act].
(b) hinder or prevent an officer from doing anything that the officer is
authorized to do under this Act.
Philippon was released on bail and returned to his home in Ste-Anne-des-
Plains, Quebec. He has entered a plea of not guilty to the Customs Act offence,
and his trial is scheduled for August 2016 before the Nova Scotia Provincial
Court in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.2
Philippon’s seemingly-ordinary case is remarkable in a number of respects,
not least of which is the reaction to it. Beginning with an initial report by the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) reporter Jack Julian that appeared
on CBC’s website and the regional television program,3 the story quickly ignited
a storm of international interest—so much so that Mr. Julian was moved to do a
follow-up story which mostly dealt with the intense level of interest in the case
among the general public.4 While the flurry of attention may have been unusual,
it seems understandable because the topic is of great interest to everyone who a)
travels, and b) owns a cell phone, tablet or computer—which adds up to a lot of
people. This interest boils down to a set of basic questions: are CBSA officials
allowed to search our devices at the border? Under what conditions and to what
extent? And if so, can people be compelled to surrender the passwords for their
locked devices, or to unlock the devices themselves, to facilitate the search?
This case also arrives at an interesting time in the development of Canadian
search and seizure jurisprudence. For some time courts all over the country have
been wrestling with why, how and under what circumstances a balance must be
struck between the privacy interests of individuals in their electronic lives and
devices, on the one hand, and the interests of the state and society in effective
criminal law enforcement, on the other. Striking such a balance is obviously as
necessary now, in the “Digital Age”, as it ever was; as Binnie J. commented in R.
v. Tessling, ‘‘social and economic life creates competing demands. The
community wants privacy but it also insists on protection. Safety, security and
the suppression of crime are legitimate countervailing concerns.”5
Since 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada has issued what in relative terms is
a large number of significant decisions on the search and seizure of computers
and other electronic devices, leading one commentator to refer to the
2 Personal communication from Joel Pink, Q.C., local counsel to Mr. Philippon.
3 Jack Julian, ‘‘Quebec resident Alain Philippon to fight charge for not giving up phone
password at airport”, CBC News (4 March 2015), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/nova-scotia/quebec-resident-alain-philippon-to-fight-charge-for-not-giving-
up-phone-password-at-airport-1.2982236>. I provided commentary for this story and
very quickly received requests for comments from numerous other media, both in
Canada and in several other countries.
4 Jack Julian, ‘‘Alain Philippon phone password case may meet Charter challenge
conditions”, CBC News (7 March 2015), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
nova-scotia/alain-philippon-phone-password-case-may-meet-charter-challenge-condi-
tions-1.2985694 >.
5 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352 (S.C.C.) at para. 17.
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‘‘digitization of section 8 of the Charter.”6 Yet the border context has remained
largely untouched in this new digital privacy era and is quite unsettled as a result.
This is in no small part because of the unique balance—or, more accurately,
imbalance—of privacy concerns and state interests that has historically existed at
the border, and which is being confronted with the new reality of ubiquitous
electronic devices being brought back and forth by travellers. This may explain
the intense interest in the Philippon case.
Using the Philippon case as a leaping-off point, this paper seeks to examine
how section 8 applies to searches of electronic devices at the border. Section I will
provide a brief review of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on search and
seizure of computers and like devices. Section II will review the current approach
taken by courts in applying section 8 of the Charter to device searches under the
Customs Act. It will also examine the few cases on point that have emerged, and
will attempt to distil something of a sensible approach to search and seizure of
electronic devices at the border. Section III will examine the particular issue
raised by the facts of the Philippon case: can individuals be compelled to unlock
their devices to facilitate a search at the border, or does this offend the principle
and Charter protections against self-incrimination? Section IV will offer a few
modest conclusions.
I. SEARCHING DEVICES: THE RECENT CASE LAW
It is not hyperbolic to say that the penetration of electronic devices into our
lives over the last decade or so has been systemic, unforeseen and far-reaching in
scope. We use them for entertainment, education, work and communication. We
also use them for storage of all kinds of information; we do this both
deliberately, in that we save emails, notes, documents, music, movies and photos
on them, and passively, in that as the devices themselves generate and store data
(often referred to as ‘‘metadata”) about how we use them, particularly (though
not exclusively) for internet use. Criminals use them for all of these purposes, any
of which might be useful towards committing or facilitating unlawful acts, or
generating evidence of them. Stalkers and intimidators carry out their urges via
text, email or Facebook message; cyberbullies take and post embarrassing photos
with their cell phones; child pornographers use all manner of devices to circulate
their wares; Crown prosecutors are often heard to remark on the evidentiary
bonanza created by the tendency of gang members to take and text photos of
drugs and guns. Moreover, many people use their devices for purposes that are
perfectly lawful but which they wanted to remain private—such as booking
sessions with a marriage counselor or divorce lawyer, taking nude ‘‘selfies,”
doing their banking, viewing legal pornography, or purchasing tickets to a
Nickelback concert.7
6 Steven Penney, ‘‘The Digitization of Section 8 of the Charter: Reform or Revolution?”
(2014) 67 SCLR 505. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c. 11 [Charter].
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This being the case, it was inevitable that the Canadian law of search and
seizure under section 8 of the Charter would need to engage with our newly
digitized reality. The Supreme Court of Canada, beginning with its landmark
decision in R. v. Morelli in 2010,8 has actively responded to this need with a series
of decisions designed to accommodate the new realities of both police
investigation and individual privacy regarding devices. This section will
quickly hit the highlights of that jurisprudence, focusing on the aspects that
are relevant to the border context to be discussed below.9
A preliminary point worth noting at the outset is one that most readers will
know: while the cases deal with computers, tablets or cell phones/smart phones
based on their specific facts, the distinction between these devices is largely
meaningless. Technology companies that manufacture the devices have actively
sought to blur whatever distinctions might exist and ensure that each device is
capable of carrying out roughly the same functions. For example, the Apple Mac
computer takes pictures and video, as does the iPad tablet, as do both the iPod
and iPhone, and all have virtually identical apps for texting, email and document
storage. The Microsoft ‘‘Surface Book” is a computer with a touch-sensitive
screen that acts like a large tablet (or it may be a tablet that acts like a small
computer—it is difficult to tell). As the Supreme Court remarked in R. v. Vu,
‘‘[a]lthough historically cellular telephones were far more restricted than
computers in terms of the amount and kind of information that they could
store, present day phones have capacities that are, for our purposes, equivalent
to those of computers.”10
Accordingly, the internal workings and functionality of this machinery is so
similar that the law applies, for all meaningful purposes, in the same way. The
various devices will be referred to, generically, as ‘‘devices” unless the factual
setting dictates otherwise.
(a) Morelli (2010)
At issue in Morelli was whether the police had reasonable and probable
grounds to search the accused’s personal computer for child pornography and
the defectiveness of the Information to Obtain (ITO) that had been used to
7 Imake the latter observation solely on thebasis that this hugely successfulCanadian rock
band is nonetheless intensely unpopular in some circles, and not to take a position on the
issue; though see Shaunacy Ferro, ‘‘A Scientific Explanation for Why Everyone Hates
Nickelback” mental_floss (6 April 2016), online: <http://mentalfloss.com/article/
78221/scientific-explanation-why-everyone-hates-nickelback >.
8 2010 SCC 8, 2010 CarswellSask 150, 2010 CarswellSask 151 (S.C.C.) [Morelli].
9 This section draws on an excellent recent article by Nader Hasan, ‘‘A Step Forward or
Just a Sidestep? Year Five of the SupremeCourt of Canada in theDigital Age” (2015) 71
SCLR 439 [Hasan].
10 2013 SCC 60, 2013 CarswellBC 3342, 2013 CarswellBC 3343 (S.C.C.) at para. 38 [Vu].
And see R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202, 2014 CarswellOnt 17203
(S.C.C.) at para. 51 [Fearon].
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obtain the search warrant. There were two points of interest: first, it was clear
that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer such
that a warrant was required—so clear that the court simply took it as given.
Second, in commenting on the invasiveness of a search of a device during his
section 24(2) exclusion analysis, Fish J. for the majority threw down the gauntlet
of electronic privacy:
It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer. . .
Computers often contain our most intimate correspondence. They
contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations.
They even reveal our specific interests, likes, and propensities,
recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we
seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.
It is therefore difficult to conceive a s. 8 breach with a greater impact on
the Charter-protected privacy interests of the accused than occurred in
this case.11
This robust privacy interest in devices also impacted the court’s analysis in R. v.
Cole,12 where a teacher was held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his workplace computer, despite the fact that it was owned by the school board
by which he was employed, because he had been permitted to use it for some
personal purposes. The data in the computer could reveal financial, medical or
personal matters, and his ‘‘specific interests, likes, and propensities;” this was
personal information that ‘‘falls at the very heart of the ‘biographical core’
protected by s. 8 of the Charter.”13
(b) Vu (2013)
In Vu the police obtained a warrant to search a residence for evidence that
would indicate the owners and occupants of the residence. While the ITO
specified ‘‘computer generated documents” it did not specifically authorize the
search of computers. Two computers and a cell phone were found and searched,
revealing that Vu was a resident. The British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed
the trial judge’s exclusion of the evidence, reasoning that the warrant did not
have to specifically authorize the search of devices, since such a device was
analogous to a ‘‘four-drawer filing cabinet” which could be searched because it
was found within the place for which the search was authorized.14
11 Morelli, supra note 8 at paras. 2, 105-106.
12 2012 SCC 53, 2012 CarswellOnt 12684, 2012 CarswellOnt 12685 (S.C.C.).
13 Ibid, at paras. 47-48.The court paid particular attention to the fact that therewere images
ofCole’swife on the computer, and the policewitnesses even acknowledged that he had a
privacy interest in those (see, e.g., para. 119), illustrating the point made above about
device content that is lawful but intensely private.
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A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed with Cromwell J. writing a judgment
that rested on the ‘‘markedly different” privacy interests in devices as
distinguished from cupboards, filing cabinets or other ‘‘receptacles.”15 Beyond
the highly personal nature of the information contained in devices, which they
had discussed in Morelli and Cole, the court set out four ways in which
computers were so ‘‘markedly different”:
1) ‘‘immense” capacity: devices have the capability of storing exponentially
larger amounts of data than any physical receptacle.16 ‘‘An 80-gigabyte
desktop drive—and commercial hard drives have far greater capacities—-
can store the equivalent of 40 million pages of text.”17
2) storage scope: a device, the court emphasized, is a ‘‘fastidious record
keeper,” with word processors generating temporary files and browsers
generating search records, all of which is created by users ‘‘unwittingly,”
amounting to a kind of information that ‘‘has no analogue in the physical
world.”18
3) lack of deletion: devices do not actually destroy data that a user has
deleted by way of normal deletion functions, but rather re-assign the disc
space used and move the data around so that it is functionally inaccessible,
but forensically retrievable. ‘‘Computers thus compromise the ability of
users to control the information that is available about them in two ways:
they create information without the users’ knowledge and they retain
information that users have tried to erase.”19
4) connectivity: while traditional warrants allow police to access a ‘‘building,
receptacle or place,” devices will most often be connected to either a
network or the internet that provide access to a wide variety of other data
in other locations. ‘‘Thus, a search of a computer connected to the
Internet or a network gives access to information and documents that are
not in any meaningful sense at the location for which the search is
authorized.”20
Accordingly, devices cannot be searched unless the warrant specifically
authorizes it and ITOs must provide grounds for doing so. Moreover, the
manner of search had to be reasonable, and ex post review would pay attention
to this—police do not necessarily have ‘‘licence to scour the devices
14 R. v. Vu, 2011 BCCA536, 2011CarswellBC 3551 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 63, affirmed in Vu,
supra note 10.
15 Vu, supra note 10 at para. 24.
16 Ibid, at para. 41.
17 Gerald Chan, ‘‘Life After Vu: Manner of Computer Searches and Search Protocols”
(2014) 67 SCLR 433 at 438, and ibid.
18 Vu, supra note 10 at para. 42.
19 Ibid, at para. 43.
20 Ibid, at para. 44.
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indiscriminately,” and in some situations ex ante search protocols will be
required.21
(c) Spencer (2014)
In R. v. Spencer22 a Saskatoon police officer involved in a child pornography
investigation obtained the Internet Protocol address (IP address) of an individual
who appeared to be sharing images with others, and approached the Internet
Service Provider, Shaw, with a ‘‘law enforcement request” for information
identifying the user under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act.23 He obtained this information, without a warrant. The Supreme
Court held that despite the fact that the identifying information (name, address,
and telephone number) matched a publicly available IP address, the user did
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information because ‘‘it was the
identity of an Internet subscriber which corresponded to particular Internet
usage.”24 Knowledge of a person’s internet usage would tend to reveal a great
deal about them—likes, dislikes, habits, and predilections. Unfettered state
access to this kind of knowledge would impact the individual’s informational
privacy,25 particularly the right to use the internet in a reasonably anonymous
manner:26
the police request to link a given IP address to subscriber information
was in effect a request to link a specific person (or a limited number of
persons in the case of shared Internet services) to specific online
activities. This sort of request engages the anonymity aspect of the
informational privacy interest by attempting to link the suspect with
anonymously undertaken online activities, activities which have been
recognized by the court in other circumstances as engaging significant
privacy interests[.]27
In the circumstances, Spencer’s expectation of privacy in the subscriber
information had been reasonable, and a warrant or production order should
have been obtained.
(d) Fearon (2014)
In Fearon, the Supreme Court dealt with what had until then been a divisive
issue: what is the scope for searching devices in a person’s possession when the
individual is being searched incident to arrest?28 Fearon was searched after being
21 Ibid, at para. 61.
22 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014 CarswellSask 343 (S.C.C.) [Spencer].
23 See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5.
24 Spencer, supra note 22 at para. 32.
25 As the court noted, its section 8 jurisprudence has dealt with ‘‘three broad types of
privacy interests—territorial, personal and informational” (ibid, at para. 35).
26 Ibid, at paras. 39-46.
27 Ibid, at para. 50.
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arrested for an armed robbery and his phone was taken. The arresting officers
looked through various applications on his phone and discovered a draft text
with an incriminating admission, as well as a photo of a gun that turned out to be
the one used in the robbery. The majority of the court ruled that phones could
properly be searched incident to arrest, so as not to defeat the important law
enforcement needs during arrests.
However, emphasizing once again the significant differences between a
device and any other kind of material that would normally be found on an
individual’s person,29 Cromwell J. for the majority held that the search should be
strictly limited. This was a warrantless search, an exception carved out by the
common law for the naturally-occurring law enforcement interests that needed to
be served in the context of an arrest; otherwise, reasonable and probable grounds
would be required. Accordingly, a search following a lawful arrest must be truly
incidental to the arrest, with three specific limitations:
– both the nature and the extent of the search must be incidental to the
arrest.
In practice, this will mean that, generally, even when a cell phone search
is permitted because it is truly incidental to the arrest, only recently sent
or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log may be examined as in
most cases only those sorts of items will have the necessary link to the
purposes for which prompt examination of the device is permitted. But
these are not rules, and other searches may in some circumstances be
justified.30
– the ‘‘discovery of evidence” purpose which would make a search truly
incident to arrest must be treated restrictively and only in play if ‘‘the
investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability
to properly search the cell phone”;31
– since the search is available without prior authorization, ‘‘after-the-fact
judicial review is especially important” to ensure the constitutionality of
the search. Accordingly, police should keep careful notes of the search:
‘‘The record should generally include the applications searched, the extent
of the search, the time of the search, its purpose and its duration.”32
In sum, then, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that both the
nature and the scope of the data stored within a device—be it a cell phone,
computer or tablet—mean that these are places that people have a very intense
and justiciable privacy interest. These findings are also commensurate with those
28 Fearon, supra note 10.
29 The privacy interest inherent in a cell phone, particularly, was also spoken to quite
powerfully by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, 2013
CarswellNS 242 (N.S. C.A) at paras. 75-76.
30 Fearon, supra note 10 at para. 76.
31 Ibid, at para. 83.
32 Ibid, at paras. 82-83.
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in the 2014 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Riley v. California,33 in which
that court noted, ‘‘a cell phone search would typically expose to the government
far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”34 As one commentator
noted, ‘‘the idea that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his cell phone and other digital devices is no longer the subject of
serious debate.”35 The intense nature of this privacy interest, however, bumps up
against other perhaps equally intense state interests at the border, and the
discussion will now turn there.
II. SECTION 8 AT THE BORDER
(a) The Customs Context
The CBSA is charged with administering several pieces of federal legislation
that might operate at the border, including the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, the Criminal Code,36 and the Customs Act. For present purposes I
am concerned with the powers to question and search individuals entering
Canada, which CBSA agents exercise pursuant to the Customs Act. It is clear that
once CBSA agents have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an
offence has been committed (and/or that they will find evidence of an offence),
then regular criminal procedure and attendant Charter standards kick in. What
often gets the CBSA officials to that conclusion, however, is the exercise of their
broader Customs Act questioning and search powers; the usual pattern is that an
individual arriving in Canada is subjected to ‘‘ordinary” border screening, during
which the CBSA staff notice something unusual or find evidence of some kind of
contraband, which leads to a more intrusive search, which in turn leads to arrest,
Charter caution and—almost inevitably—conviction.
The Customs Act contains an array of provisions that authorize CBSA staff
to question individuals, search their persons and belongings, and examine items
in their possession and/or which they are importing. Sections 11 and 13 require
people arriving in Canada to: present themselves to a customs officer and answer
truthfully any questions asked; answer questions about any goods they have
imported; and unload, unpack or open any container containing the goods. The
actual search provisions break down into three sets of searches: searches of
people on the basis of reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed
33 134 S.Ct. 2473 (U.S. Cal. Sup. Ct., 2014) [Riley]. The overall finding in Riley was that a
search warrant is required to search a cell phone incident to arrest, a position which the
Supreme Court of Canada was not prepared to take in Fearon, supra note 10.
34 Ibid, at 2491.
35 Agathon Fric, ‘‘Reasonableness as Proportionality: Towards a Better Constructive
Interpretation of the LawonSearchingComputers inCanada” (2016) 21Appeal 59 at 64
(QL) [Fric].
36 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27;Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46.
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(sections 98(1), 99.2(1)); searches of a person’s goods (whether imported or on
their person) on the basis of reasonable suspicion that an offence has been
committed (sections 99(1)(e), 99.1(2)(b) and 99.3(2)); and searches of imported
goods and any goods in custody or possession of an individual entering or
leaving a customs-controlled area, without any grounds (sections 99(1)(a) and
99.3(1), respectively). All of these searches are warrantless.
As will be seen, most important here are the latter two provisions:
– section 99(1)(a), which allows a CBSA officer to examine any goods that
have been imported and ‘‘open or cause to be opened any package or
container of imported goods”; and
– section 99.3(1), which allows a CBSA officer to conduct a ‘‘non-intrusive
examination of goods in the custody or possession of a person who is in or
leaving a customs-controlled area.”
Again, unlike the rest of the search provisions, neither of these latter searches
require that the official have reasonable grounds or even reasonable suspicion
that an offence has been committed or that anything at all is awry.
As in all Charter-related matters, context is everything, and the border
context has received specialized treatment by the courts due to the unique
interplay of state interests and individual freedoms that is engaged. Starting with
the leading 1988 case of R. v. Simmons,37 the Supreme Court of Canada and all
Canadian courts have recognized that the state is given a wide and permissive
scope of inspection and interference with individual interests because of its
compelling duty to protect its sovereignty and populace by ‘‘control[ling] both
who and what enters their boundaries.”38 In particular, there is a much-reduced
expectation of privacy at the border. As Justice Doherty expressed it (though
speaking specifically to the principle of self-incrimination):
No one entering Canada reasonably expects to be left alone by the
state, or to have the right to choose whether to answer questions
routinely asked of persons seeking entry to Canada. As the appellant
himself testified, travellers reasonably expect that they will be
questioned at the border and will be expected to answer those questions
truthfully. Travellers also reasonably expect that Customs authorities
will routinely and randomly search their luggage. Put simply, the
premise underlying the principle against self-incrimination, that is, that
individuals are entitled to be left alone by the state absent cause being
shown by the state, does not operate at the border. The opposite is true.
The state is expected and required to interfere with the personal
autonomy and privacy of persons seeking entry to Canada. Persons
seeking entry are expected to submit to and co-operate with that state
intrusion in exchange for entry into Canada.39
37 1998 CarswellOnt 91, 1988 CarswellOnt 968, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.) [Simmons].
38 Ibid, at para. 49.
39 R. v. Jones, 2006 CarswellOnt 4972, [2006] O.J. No. 3315 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 30 [Jones].
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Justice Ryan summarized the general tenor of this jurisprudence effectively in
R. v. Sekhon, emphasizing its ‘‘two key features”:
First, that travellers reasonably expect that they will be subject to
screening procedures when crossing international boundaries, and
second, that there is a compelling state interest in protecting the
security of Canada’s borders, and in preventing the entry of illegal or
contraband goods into the country through our borders. . .
Authorities have repeatedly noted that travellers seeking to cross
national boundaries fully expect to be subject to a screening process.
Furthermore, this process will typically require the production of
identification, travel documentation, and involve a search process.40
In Simmons, Dickson C.J. identified three levels of border search which still
appear to govern the case law:
First is the routine of questioning which every traveller undergoes at a
port of entry, accompanied in some cases by a search of baggage and
perhaps a pat or frisk of outer clothing. No stigma is attached to being
one of the thousands of travellers who are daily routinely checked in
that manner upon entry to Canada and no constitutional issues are
raised. It would be absurd to suggest that a person in such
circumstances is detained in a constitutional sense and therefore
entitled to be advised of his or her right to counsel. The second type of
border search is the strip or skin search of the nature of that to which
the present appellant was subjected, conducted in a private room, after
a secondary examination and with the permission of a customs officer
in authority. The third and most highly intrusive type of search is that
sometimes referred to as the body cavity search, in which customs
officers have recourse to medical doctors, to X-rays, to emetics, and to
other highly invasive means.41
A full review of border search jurisprudence is obviously beyond the scope of
this paper. However, one important technical point emerges from the case law
around the scope of the Simmons first-level search. Many readers will be familiar
with the idea of ‘‘secondary inspection,” whereby an initial conversation with a
CBSA official (whether at an airport or auto-traffic border inspection facility) is
followed by ‘‘secondary inspection” where a more detailed conversation and
search of the individual’s belongings is carried out. Secondary inspection is
treated as a wholly discretionary decision on the part of CBSA staff for which
they need not have reasonable grounds or even form a reasonable suspicion
(though CBSA staff have indicated in testimony that they do look for
40 R. v. Sekhon, 2009 BCCA 187, 2009 CarswellBC 1094 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 68, 22, leave
to appeal refused 2009 CarswellBC 2991, 2009 CarswellBC 2992 (S.C.C.). A later-stage
appeal on an unrelated issuewas dismissed, see 2014 SCC15, 2014CarswellBC 379, 2014
CarswellBC 380 (S.C.C.).
41 Simmons, supra note 37 at para. 27.
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‘‘indicators” for referral to secondary inspection, such as nervousness, hesitancy
in answering questions, odd travel patterns indicated by passport contents, or
receiving information via other government sources).42 Also, a ‘‘secondary”
inspection does not remove the situation from the first Simmons search level—it
‘‘remains a routine part of the general screening process for persons seeking entry
to Canada.”43
(b) Canadian Case Law on E-Device Searches at the Border
While there is a reasonably substantial jurisprudence on border searches,
there have not been a large number of reported cases specifically dealing with
devices; my research turned up only eight, with a few scattered references to
unreported decisions therein.44 Perhaps unsurprisingly, six of the eight dealt with
child pornography that was found on the devices45 and all of them were dealt
with as being ‘‘first level” routine searches under the Simmons criteria. In one
case, Moroz, the court appeared to find that section 8 did not apply; in six cases
the court found that there had been no breach of section 8 or any other Charter
rights; in the eighth, the court found a section 8 breach but dismissed an
application by the accused for exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).46
As a group these cases have raised a number of different issues. While, as
explored below, the decisions do not always adhere rigorously to the Supreme
Court’s established section 8 methodology, it is helpful to organize the issues
raised in keeping with that framework, which can be summarized as follows.
First, was there a ‘‘search,” i.e. was there a reasonable expectation of privacy in
42 See, e.g., R. v. Buss, 2014 BCPC 16, 2014 CarswellBC 485 (B.C. Prov Ct.) at para. 12
[Buss];R. v. Agyeman-Anane, 2009 CarswellOnt 5956, [2009] O.J. No. 6005 (Ont. S.C.J.)
at paras. 4-6 [Agyeman-Anane].
43 R. v. Hudson, 2005 CarswellOnt 7378, 77 O.R. (3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 35, quoting
Deghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment& Immigration), 1993CarswellNat 57, 1993
CarswellNat 1380, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053 (S.C.C.).
44 R. v. Leask, 2008ONCJ 25, 2008 CarswellOnt 415 (Ont. Ct. J.) [Leask]; R. v. Bares, 2008
CarswellOnt 1265, [2008] O.J. No. 900 (Ont. S.C.J.);R. v.Mozo, 2010 CarswellNfld 447,
[2010] N.J. No. 445 (N.L. Prov. Ct.) [Mozo]; R. v. Whittaker, 2010 NBPC 32, 2010
CarswellNB 489 (N.B. Prov. Ct.) [Whittaker]; R. v. Appleton, 2011 CarswellOnt 11191,
97 W.C.B. (2d) 444 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Appleton]; R. v. Moroz, 2012 ONSC 5642, 2012
CarswellOnt 12614 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Moroz]; R. v. Saikaley, 2012 ONSC 6794, [2012] O.J.
No. 6024 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Saikaley]; Buss, supra note 42.
45 Strictly speaking, the images in Bares, ibid, were not on a device but on a CD; however,
the law was applied similarly.
46 This result was very much a function of the facts of this case, Appleton, supra note 44.
Duringa routine border search, a handgunhadbeen found in a glove compartment of the
accused’s car. The CBSA officer was later handed the accused’s cellphone and testified
that he searched it ‘‘for information”; the court held this to be a search in furtherance of
arrest, which required a warrant, and thus section 8 had been breached. However, the
breach was minimal due to the accused’s reduced expectation of privacy at the border,
the limited intrusion into the phone and the officer’s belief that he was acting in good
faith.
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the subject matter affected by the police investigational technique? Second, was
the search reasonable, which breaks down to the three sub-questions of the
Collins47 test: i) was the search authorized by law; ii) was the law itself
reasonable; and iii) was the manner in which the search was carried out
reasonable?48
(i) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy at the Border
The first prong of a section 8 analysis is whether the accused had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances of the case, as a search is
only a ‘‘search” that engages section 8 if there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy.49 It is well-established that the reasonableness of the expectation of
privacy varies with the context,50 not least at the border. As the British Columbia
Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Nagle, ‘‘Border crossings are not Charter-free
zones.”51 However, there is an odd streak around the applicability of section 8 in
the context of the first-level searches, which appears to stem from Simmons. As
set out above, in Simmons Chief Justice Dickson stated the following about the
first-level inspection:
[T]he routine of questioning which every traveller undergoes at a port
of entry, accompanied in some cases by a search of baggage and perhaps
a pat or frisk of outer clothing. No stigma is attached to being one of the
thousands of travellers who are daily routinely checked in that manner
upon entry to Canada and no constitutional issues are raised. It would
be absurd to suggest that a person in such circumstances is detained in a
constitutional sense and therefore entitled to be advised of his or her
right to counsel [emphasis added].52
In remarking that ‘‘no constitutional issues are raised,” Dickson C.J. was
making the point that the first-level inspection was not a detention and therefore
the Charter did not apply—in particular, section 10 of the Charter, but the
47 R. v. Collins, 1987 CarswellBC 94, 1987 CarswellBC 699, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) at
para. 23; R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, 2010 CarswellAlta 2269, 2010 CarswellAlta 2270
(S.C.C.) at para. 20.
48 This distillation is drawn from Steve Coughlan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed. (Toronto:
Irwin, 2016) at 67, and see generally Chapter 4 [Coughlan]. See also Steven Penney,
‘‘Unreasonable Search andSeizure and Section 8 of theCharter: Cost-benefit Analysis in
Constitutional Interpretation” in Errol Mendes & Stéphane Beaulac, eds, Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) 745
[Mendes & Beaulac].
49 Coughlan, ibid at 67.
50 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v.
Southam Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, 1984 CarswellAlta 415, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145
(S.C.C.) at 159 [S.C.R.] [Hunter].
51 2012 BCCA 373, 2012 CarswellBC 2859 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 81, leave to appeal refused
2013 CarswellBC 685, 2013 CarswellBC 686 (S.C.C.).
52 Simmons, supra note 37 at para. 27.
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statement does seem to imply that no part of the Charter applies to the first-level
inspection. It is not entirely clear, and it is important to note that the case itself
dealt with a second-level search and whether and how sections 8 and 10 applied
in that context; nothing else was said about the applicability of the Charter to
first-level searches. The statement has nonetheless been interpreted as meaning
that Charter rights simply do not apply to the first-level search. In Jones Justice
Doherty cited this part of Simmons and stated:
The first, or least intrusive level of that action, involves routine
questioning of travellers, the search of their luggage, and perhaps a pat-
down search of the person. If state action involves only this level of
intrusion, the rights protected by s. 10(b) and s. 8 of the Charter are not
engaged [emphasis added].53
Similarly, in Nagle the Court of Appeal remarked:
In the context of border crossings, routine questioning, the search of
baggage and pat-down searches are standard practices, applicable to
every ordinary traveller, and is expected and tolerated by anyone
wishing to travel internationally. This conduct by border agents does
not engage constitutional rights, including detention, the right to counsel
or a reasonable expectation of privacy [emphasis added].54
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is not unusual to see the Crown relying upon this
case law and urging upon the courts the proposition that section 8 of the Charter
simply does not apply to the first-level searches.55 And yet, the courts dealing
with searches of devices have consistently treated section 8 as applicable to even
the first-level searches. Nagle, though it dealt with the search of the accused’s
purse during a routine inspection, was a case of this sort and is cited in the device
cases. Even after making the statement cited above, the Court of Appeal went on
to assess the reasonableness of the search, noting along the way that:
The expectation of privacy is considerably lower for an international
traveller. There is clearly some expectation of privacy, which is
addressed in many cases, commencing with Simmons, but no constitu-
tional right to be free from the search of bags, purses, luggage or a pat
down exists when one decides to cross a border [emphasis added].56
The key may be acknowledging that Simmons, a 1988 case, well pre-dates the
section 8 methodology that we now use. Arguably starting with R. v. Edwards in
1996,57 the threshold question about section 8’s applicability is whether a
traveller has a reasonable expectation of privacy—here, in their person, items on
the person and in luggage (including electronic devices). The argument cannot be
53 Jones, supra note 39 at para. 32, and see para. 37.
54 Nagle, supra note 51 at para. 34.
55 E.g. Saikaley andMozo, supra note 44.
56 Nagle, supra note 51 at para. 75.
57 1996 CarswellOnt 2126, 1996 CarswellOnt 1916, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.).
302 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [14 C.J.L.T.]
that one simply does not have any expectation of privacy in these places, since
they are paradigmatically ‘‘personal” and contain information going to one’s
biographical core. On this basis, even the first-level search is a ‘‘search” and thus
engages section 8. Rather, the important point of Simmons is that due to the
unique context of the border, the expectation of privacy is a very attenuated one.
Accordingly, a standard first-level search impacts on what is already a reduced
expectation of privacy and will most often be ‘‘reasonable” in its execution.
This helps to explain the result of Nagle, if not all of its language, as well as
the usual approach of the courts in the device cases. In the context of electronic
devices it also lays to rest the idea that the extremely powerful privacy interest
with which the Supreme Court has imbued devices and their contents, laid out in
the previous section, can simply evaporate when one arrives at the border; more
on this below.
(ii) Was the Search Authorized by Law?
In the cases it is essentially taken as given that the first-level search is
authorized by law because of the expansive search powers set out in the Customs
Act as outlined above. The searches are in every case conducted without recourse
to the ‘‘reasonable grounds to suspect” language in some of the provisions, and
tend to be argued on the basis of section 99(1)(a) of the Act which permits
warrantless searches of goods that have been ‘‘imported.” However, the notion
of ‘‘importation” does not correspond very well to items that an individual has
on his/her person, even though the definition of ‘‘import” was amended to
provide that taking a good out of Canada and returning with it ‘‘is an
importation of those goods.”58 Section 99.3(1) seems to be the more applicable
provision, and it has been suggested that basing the authority for these searches
on section 99(1)(a) is an error in statutory interpretation.59
Another common point on statutory authorization is that the courts have
consistently accepted that the search of a device is authorized on the basis that
the statute speaks to examining ‘‘goods.” In R. v. Whittaker,60 for example, Chief
Judge Jackson noted that the definition of ‘‘goods” in section 2 of the Act
‘‘includes. . .any document in any form,” and that the dictionary definition of
‘‘documents” includes ‘‘a computer data file.” Thus, computer files fell squarely
into this definition and the search was authorized.61 Other courts have made
similar findings.62 It will be suggested below that this is a particularly troubling
application in light of the recent Supreme Court of Canada case law on devices.
58 Customs Act, supra note 1, s. 12(3.1).
59 NaderR.Hasan&StephenAylward, ‘‘WhereWe’veBeen andWhereWe’reGoing:New
Frontiers inDigital Privacy and s. 8 of theCharter” (2016) at 11 (copyon filewith author)
[Hasan & Aylward].
60 Whittaker, supra note 44.
61 Ibid, at para. 8.
62 Leask, Appleton, Moroz, Saikaley, supra note 44, and Buss, supra note 42.
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One ticklish issue that has arisen in a couple of cases is where a ‘‘routine”
secondary search occurred, not because the CBSA staff picked up on any
‘‘indicators” or decided to do a random check, but because they were given
information by another law enforcement agency to the effect that the accused
was suspected of criminal activity and essentially requested to do a ‘‘routine”
search to further the criminal investigation. In Moroz,63 for example, the police
suspected that the accused possessed child pornography but were unsure whether
they had grounds for a warrant. They conveyed this information to CBSA, which
put a ‘‘Lookout” into the computer system. As a result the accused was
automatically subjected to a ‘‘routine” search of his phone when he entered
Canada64 and a child porn image was found. The court did not accept the
accused’s argument that the presence of the police investigation imposed any
standard of suspicion or belief upon the search, ruling that due to the routine
nature of the search it did not matter how the CBSA officials came to decide to
undertake it—they were empowered under section 99(1) to do it in any event.65
The same finding was made on fairly similar facts in Saikaley,66 where the court
also relied on the ‘‘dual purpose search” doctrine from R. v. Nolet67 to find that
the search came under the authority of the Customs Act and therefore did not
require any standard of suspicion or belief for the search.68
(iii) Reasonableness of the Law
In every reported case the courts have been at great pains to hold, while not
always framing it as such, that the Customs Act’s authorization of first-level
searches is eminently reasonable. The rationale applied always rests on the two-
step policy justification explained above, typically citing both Simmons and
Jones. First, the state has a powerful, sovereign interest in maintaining the
integrity of its borders and protecting Canadians from the importation of illegal
and/or harmful materials. Second, and stemming from the latter policy, there is
an extremely attenuated expectation of privacy at the border generally, ‘‘lower
than in most other situations,”69 and in particular for people who are seeking to
enter Canada. In Jones Justice Doherty held that the need for border protection
was a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter,70 and
distilled the situation to a quid pro quo proposition: ‘‘Persons seeking entry are
63 Moroz, supra note 44.
64 Ibid, at para. 5.
65 Ibid, at paras. 16-21, relying on R. v. Sahota, 2009 CarswellOnt 4989, [2009] O.J. No.
3519 (Ont. S.C.J.).
66 Saikaley, supra note 44.
67 2010 SCC 24, 2010 CarswellSask 268, 2010 CarswellSask 369 (S.C.C.) cited at para. 88.
68 Saikaley is apparently pending before the Ontario Court of Appeal; Hasan & Aylward,
supra note 59.
69 Simmons, supra note 37 at para. 49.
70 Jones, supra note 39 at para. 31.
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expected to submit to and co-operate with that state intrusion in exchange for
entry into Canada.”71
Courts also rely on the finding that a device is ‘‘good” for Customs Act
purposes, not just as a way of demonstrating that the search is authorized by law,
but as a means of demonstrating the reasonableness of the law. There is a great
degree of comfort found in analogizing devices to suitcases or other objects that
individuals might have with them.72 However, this consideration tends to be
discussed more as an aspect of the reasonableness of the search, considered in the
next subsection.
(iv) Reasonableness of the Search
First-level customs searches of devices are nearly inevitably found to have
been executed reasonably by those courts that consider them. This analysis has
proceeded along two lines. First, judges have consistently rejected defence
arguments that searches of their devices were more invasive, and produced a
greater impact on privacy, than searches of their luggage. Justice Nadel’s
statements to this effect in Leask are demonstrative and have been cited
frequently in subsequent cases:
Exceptional storage capacity is what makes a computer such a
potentially dangerous reservoir of the most pernicious forms of child
pornography, viz videos and photographs. I reject the contention that a
search of a computer is tantamount to a psychological strip or cavity
search. In the context of a search at the border, the suggestion that a
computer ought to be viewed an extension of one’s memory is pure
hyperbole. Moreover, the suggestion that searching a computer being
imported into the country would cause fear and apprehension in a
reasonable person is, to my mind, incredible and untenable. The kind of
computer search conducted here required no special equipment and no
special expertise. There is no suggestion that after such a search is
performed there will be any damage or change to the condition or
content of the computer.
Moreover, any search at the border of one’s pockets, carryall or
baggage could result in all manner of personal and private items being
surveyed or touched by a stranger and resulting in some level of
embarrassment or a feeling of discomfort. I see no intrinsic difference
between the effects of the computer search at issue here and the
intrusiveness or the embarrassment attendant upon a search of a wallet
or purse or the requirement to turn out of one’s pockets or to be
subjected to a detailed examination of the contents of one’s suitcase. . .
In brief compass, the search of Mr. Leask’s computer was a routine
border search for child pornography. It was no different than routine
71 Ibid, at para. 30.
72 See e.g.Mozo, supra note 44 at para. 12.
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searches conducted, without any prior reasonable suspicion, for other
forms of contraband, including searches for firearms, explosives,
narcotics, undeclared alcohol or tobacco or other goods that a traveller
may seek to smuggle into Canada.73
While Leask itself is from 2008, it is odd that this passage has, indeed, been
quoted so extensively by cases that came after the release of Morelli in 2010,
given how completely inconsistent with Morelli it is.
Second, courts have often emphasized that the searches being considered
were relatively un-intrusive, in the sense that they were ‘‘cursory” and did not
change or impair the devices or their data in any way. This was cited specifically
in the passage from Leask, quoted above. In Buss (the only post-Vu case, though
it came before Fearon) Judge Oulton held that the case law established that a
‘‘non-destructive” routine search of a device at the border was reasonable.74
While acknowledging the increased privacy interest in devices that had been
found by the Supreme Court in Morelli and Vu, she distinguished those cases on
the basis that what was being discussed was full forensic searches of computers,
as opposed to ‘‘the type of brief cursory search of sent text messages, photo
galleries and photos on a computer, generated by the device’s own search
capacity and relying on no tools or software”75 which she was considering.
Similarly, in Whittaker Chief Judge Jackson noted that while specialized
software76 had been used to search the device, ‘‘it did not alter or impair in any
manner either the computers themselves or their contents, that is, the data
stored.”77
To the extent it can be discerned from the reported cases, this practice of
‘‘cursory” searches seems to be an act of voluntary restraint on the part of CBSA
officials. In nearly all of the cases the ‘‘routine” search was confined to easily
accessible parts of the device and terminated upon the finding of (usually) a
single child pornography image, or in one case78 drug trafficking-related evidence
that the officers had been told to look out for. In Buss, a CBSA officer testified
that CBSA policy is ‘‘to stop examination after one image is found.”79 This seems
a reasonable and careful practice in the context of a search that can be made by
the CBSA without reasonable grounds or even reasonable suspicion, and
subsequent searches appear to be made under warrant. The scope of the search,
then, is similar to that permitted by the Supreme Court in Fearon for a search
73 Leask, supra note 44 at paras. 15, 16, 18.
74 Buss, supra note 42 at para. 30.
75 Ibid, at para. 23. The search inVu had, in fact, been a fairly cursory one and not forensic
(Vu, supra note 10 at para. 72).
76 A program called ‘‘I see what you see,” which at least in this case only searched the C:
drive of a computer.
77 Whittaker, supra note 44 at para. 13.
78 Saikaley, supra note 44.
79 Buss, supra note 42 at para. 17.
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incident to arrest, a comparison that will be useful when I propose a new set of
analytical criteria for device searches at the border, below.
(c) Constructing a New Standard
As noted at the outset of this article, thus far in the case law the border
context has remained untouched by the manner in which the Supreme Court has
developed the privacy protections for electronic devices under section 8 of the
Charter. The one decision released after Vu and Spencer, Buss, dealt with this sea
change in only a perfunctory manner. It is high time that this situation was
brought up to date. Despite the overall lower expectation of privacy at the
border, computers are not truly ‘‘goods” as that term is defined in the Customs
Act, are not analogous to suitcases, handbags or purses, and need to be treated
with greater attention to the privacy interest attached to them. While on the
reported facts of the Philippon case it is not clear whether a search even took
place, the legality of the search will no doubt form an important backdrop to the
ultimate ruling in the case.
While the developments in the law around search and seizure regarding
devices have been significant, I would contend that nothing revolutionary is
needed to adapt border searches and bring them in line with these developments.
Rather, all that is required is careful attention to the established section 8
methodology, with an eye to properly weighing the privacy interest in devices
against the state objectives in the border context. Mirroring section (b), above,
below I set out a proposal for an analytical framework that might accomplish
this.
(i) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
It is trite indeed to recite Hunter’s holding that section 8 protects ‘‘people,
not places,”80 but it does emphasize that, at the border, the reasonable
expectation of privacy inquiry is focused on the individual’s body and on objects
which they own and possess. It is also important not to forget the prophylactic
function ascribed to section 8 in Hunter, the idea that section 8 should prevent
unreasonable searches before they occur rather than simply provide remedies
after; indeed, Chief Justice Dickson invoked this in Simmons itself, noting that
the prophylactic function is ‘‘foremost” among the values that section 8 was
designed to protect.81 It may be that the border search case law generally has
gone awry because of failure to adhere to these propositions. Starting with
Simmons there was arguably too much attention to the relatively reduced level of
privacy an individual enjoys at the border due to the powerful countervailing
state interests. This is a fair enough point, but it has obscured the fact that there
is, nonetheless, some reasonable expectation of privacy at the border, and that
80 Hunter, supra note 50 at 159.
81 Simmons, supra note 37 at para. 50.
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fact alone means that the search of a device at the border—however ‘‘routine” or
‘‘cursory”—is a search nonetheless, and section 8 applies.
Practically speaking, it is well-known that most people travelling through a
border will not be subjected to a search, since this would impede the desired
efficiency of border processing. This statistical likelihood of being left alone is
itself a form of reasonably-anticipated privacy. Moreover, people do not expect
that they must, as a pre-requisite for entering or leaving the country, spill out
absolutely every grain of their core of biographical information; rather, they
reasonably expect that some lesser amount of privacy is attached to their
persons, luggage and items they have brought with them.
Finally, as regards electronic devices specifically, in light of the recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence it is fallacious to assert that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in them or their contents. That much is obvious. In
Spencer the court restated its 4-part framework for determining whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists: 1) the subject matter of the alleged
search; 2) the claimant’s interest in the subject matter; 3) the claimant’s subjective
expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and 4) whether this subjective
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, having regard to the totality of
the circumstances.82 Bearing in mind the case law canvassed in Section I, above,
the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in devices—and specifically in the
information and data contained in them—is clear. Even though the ‘‘totality of
the circumstances” must include the unique factors in play at the border, some
expectation of privacy remains reasonable.
What is needed is a way of measuring the reasonably reduced expectation of
privacy that exists at the border and the extent of permissible state intrusion into
it. However, that is better accomplished with the Collins test, as considered
below. Accordingly, the most principled argument to be made is that, to the
extent that older case law such as Simmons and Jones appears to suggest that
section 8 does not apply to routine border searches, it is out of keeping with the
current law—and it is probably time for the Crown to stop arguing the contrary.
(ii) Collins Part 1: Is the Search Authorized by Law?
As noted earlier, the Customs Act explicitly authorizes the routine,
groundless and warrantless searches being discussed here. The two apparently
authorizing sections are set out below, for convenience:
99(1) An officer may
(a) at any time up to the time of release, examine any goods that
have been imported and open or cause to be opened any
package or container of imported goods [. . .]
99.3(1) An officer may, in accordance with the regulations and without
individualized suspicion, conduct a non-intrusive examination of goods
82 Spencer, supra note 22 at para. 18.
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in the custody or possession of a person who is in or is leaving a
customs controlled area.
Accordingly, section 99(1) allows searches of ‘‘imported goods,” while section
99.3(1) provides for ‘‘a non-intrusive examination of goods in the custody or
possession of a person who is in or is leaving a customs controlled area.” Each
explicitly authorizes a search of ‘‘goods” and the use of such a broad term by
Parliament probably does carry the intent that essentially everything brought
into a border area by an individual is caught, particularly when one considers
that screening of materials is one of the primary objectives of the Act.
As will be seen below, my overall argument is that since the privacy interest
in devices makes them profoundly different from other ‘‘goods” that an
individual might have at the border, they deserve different treatment under
section 8 than conventional ‘‘goods.” Accordingly, it could be argued that they
should be the subject of a separate defined term in the Act in order to convey this.
However, the overall argument does not turn on this, since the courts themselves
can and should treat devices differently for constitutional purposes whatever the
definitional content of the Act.
The case law thus far has proceeded on the basis that devices are properly
treated as ‘‘imported” goods under section 99(1)(a), with section 99.3(1) (a more
recent addition to the Act) going un-considered, apparently serving as a back-up
of some kind. There is some dissonance at play here, since despite the way in
which section 99(1)(a) is framed, carrying a computer or cell phone with one for
work or personal reasons does not easily comport with the idea of ‘‘importing
goods”; if I bring a suitcase with my own clothes or a briefcase with work
materials across the border, I am hardly an importer as that term is colloquially
understood. I do not need to pay duty on it, nor do I need to declare it on my
Customs card. Moreover, treating section 99(1)(a) as the authorization for
searching items located on an individual’s person arguably renders section
99.3(1) redundant,83 other than that it specifically refers to a customs-controlled
area.
Accordingly, while it seems clear that the routine search of a device is
authorized under the Act, section 99.3(1) is the more appropriate section from
which to draw the authority. That the search in the latter section is required to be
‘‘non-intrusive” figures neatly into the reasonableness analysis set out below.
(iii) Collins Part 2: Is the Law Itself Reasonable?
Thus we arrive at the crux of the matter: how to balance the significant
individual privacy in devices with the intense state interests in border security and
all that accompanies it. There is no doubt that the state’s interests in protecting
the border must shape its interactions with individuals and their privacy interests
at border crossings. It is both logical and desirable that the state may more
reasonably interfere with privacy in this setting. Yet while this shapes the
83 Hasan & Aylward, supra note 59.
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contextual privacy at play, it is important to remember that the inherent
informational privacy interest an individual has in the contents of their device
does not shrink; as Fric notes, ‘‘The qualities of a computer that invite
heightened privacy interests in the information it contains are not magically
transformed when an individual seeks entry into Canada.”84 To borrow an
analogy from Justice Binnie, as state interest in regulating borders advances,
privacy in devices does not recede.85
In the case law to date the courts have consistently rejected the argument that
a search of a device is properly placed in the context of the second-level Simmons
search, ‘‘tantamount to a psychological strip or cavity search” as Justice Nadel
put it in Leask.86 This is probably correct, at least in terms of the cursory scope
of the search as it is usually done. On the other hand, however, a device search
sits uneasily at the border of what would be considered a ‘‘routine” search, due to
the privacy interest. In Fearon, it is worth remembering, the court decided that a
cell phone search incident to arrest was not as intrusive as a strip search incident
to arrest (which is necessarily humiliating and degrading) but it was still
sufficiently more intrusive than other searches to require special rules beyond the
ordinary ones.87
While it is not appropriate to over-emphasize the ‘‘external situation in
which the search occurs,”88 in my view the key point of this context was hit upon
by Justice Doherty in Jones, when he remarked, ‘‘In a general sense, everyone
who is questioned at the border and whose luggage is examined is the target of an
investigation.”89 Border scrutiny is a quasi-law enforcement activity; in fact, it is
related in species to the deployment of sniffer dog searches that was considered
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Brown,90 R. v. M. (A.)91 and R. v.
Chehil.92 In that setting, as Justice Karakatsanis wrote in Chehil, the section 8
law strikes a balance ‘‘between society’s interest in routine crime prevention and
an individual’s interest in her own privacy.”93
It is probably not useful to torture the analogies between the use of sniffer
dogs in airports and other border settings outside the customs area, and the
screening of travellers within the fairly different setting of the actual border
84 Fric, supra note 35 at 76.
85 In R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, 2002 CarswellOnt 1968, 2002 CarswellOnt 1969 (S.C.C.),
Justice Binnie was considering the admissibility of similar fact evidence and stated, at
para. 149: ‘‘As probative value advances, prejudice does not necessarily recede.”
86 Leask, supra note 44, para. 15, and see Buss, supra note 42.
87 I owe this observation to Steve Coughlan.
88 Fric, supra note 35 at 76.
89 Jones, supra note 39 at para. 40.
90 2008 SCC 18, 2008 CarswellAlta 523, 2008 CarswellAlta 524 (S.C.C.).
91 2008 SCC 19, 2008 CarswellOnt 2257, 2008 CarswellOnt 2258 (S.C.C.)
92 2013 SCC 49, 2013 CarswellNS 693, 2013 CarswellNS 694 (S.C.C.).
93 Ibid, at para. 2.
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crossing. What is useful, however, is the balance that was struck by the court in
the sniffer dog scenario, which was accomplished by imposing a standard of
‘‘reasonable suspicion” on the searches. The justification for using this standard
for devices is similar enough to that used in the sniffer dog cases; as Professor
Coughlan states it, ‘‘where the impact of a search on a person’s privacy interests
is seen as relatively minimal, the standard for being allowed to search is lower.”94
‘‘Reasonable suspicion,” as it has been constructed by the Supreme Court, seems
tailor-made for the border device search scenario: it must amount to more than a
generalized suspicion and be based on objectively reasonable facts within the
totality of the circumstances; even potentially innocent factors (nervousness,
failure to make eye contact) can be taken into account; and officer training about
criteria to look for can be taken into account, so long as they are sufficiently
proven.95
In fact, ‘‘reasonable suspicion” bears a startling resemblance to the
constellation of factors that CBSA personnel look for in deciding to refer an
individual to a ‘‘secondary” search,96 and it is also the standard that is set out in
the other search provisions of the Customs Act. Thus, it is a standard that is
easily articulable and which the CBSA has experience applying. It is lower than
‘‘reasonable and probable grounds,” reflecting the reduced privacy in the border
context, but requires more than pure discretion, which suits the heightened
privacy interest in devices. It follows, then, that a search of a device will only take
place as a ‘‘secondary” search, following the determination of reasonable
suspicion by the official.
The effect of this proposal is to read a requirement of ‘‘reasonable suspicion”
into either of section 99(1) or section 99.3(1) (whichever is the appropriate
authorizing provision, as discussed above), but only where that search power is
invoked regarding a device. This proposal might also solve the ‘‘ancillary search”
problem raised by cases like Moroz and Saikaley, since the CBSA using
information obtained from other law enforcement personnel would be more
amenable to justifying a formalized search standard than the current, rather
surreptitious, practice.97
A reasonable suspicion standard, however, has also been held to be
appropriate because of the comparatively lower level of invasiveness in those
94 Coughlan, supra note 48 at 140.
95 Drawn from ibid at 140-141.
96 See Buss and Agyeman-Anane, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
97 Analogously, police have powers to randomly stop vehicles under provincial highway
legislation, but if they form actual suspicion about a particular vehicle then they cannot
rely on the random stop power, but must show that they have reasonable suspicion; see
e.g. R. v. Schaeffer, 2005 SKCA 33, 2005 CarswellSask 154 (Sask. C.A.), R. v. Houben,
2006 SKCA129, 2006CarswellSask 746 (Sask. C.A.),R. v. Schell, 2006 SKCA128, 2006
CarswellSask 742 (Sask. C.A.), R. v. McCammon, 2013 MBCA 68, 2013 CarswellMan
357 (Man. C.A.) andR. v. Papilion, 2014 SKCA45, 2014 CarswellSask 260 (Sask. C.A.).
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situations, e.g. dog sniffer searches, where it is applied. This is best dealt with at
the final Collins stage, regarding the manner of search.
(iv) Collins Part 3: Is the Search Carried Out in a Reasonable Manner?
The other means of striking the correct balance of state interests and
individual privacy in devices, in my view, is to restrict the scope of the search.
While it seems almost too easy a solution to graft existing law onto the border,
the court’s framing of cell phone searches as part of a search incident to arrest in
Fearon offers a useful framework. Recalling Justice Doherty’s dictum that
everyone at the border is under investigation in some sense, combined with the
very low expectation of privacy, gives the border search context a similar
contextual flavour to the arrest context. First, the search incident to arrest, said
the court in Fearon, must be ‘‘truly” incidental, in that the search must be
necessary to further the arrest. Here, the search should only occur if the CBSA
officer has a reasonable suspicion that contraband is being smuggled or some
other statutory breach has occurred/is under way, and so the search of the device
should be clearly linked to this purpose.
Second, the search is not open-ended, but rather is limited to the more basic
apps on the device—sent and draft emails and texts, photos, call logs, note-
taking apps and anything similar. As noted above, this is quite consistent with
the way in which CBSA searches are currently conducted, and suits the major
concern at play, which is that contraband (almost inevitably child pornography)
is being smuggled in on the device. It also comports with section 99.3(1)’s
requirement that the search be ‘‘non-intrusive.” The search should stop,
naturally, when any actual contraband is found, and a warrant obtained for
further search (no doubt following an arrest). Similarly, any search of the device
exceeding this ‘‘cursory” search, such as forensic analysis or mirroring the hard
drive, would require reasonable and probable grounds and a warrant.
Restricting the scope in this way also provides a means to avoid a fairly
major problem that, while it has gone mostly unaddressed in Canadian case law,
has significant international ramifications, which is often referred to as ‘‘the
portal problem.” As the Supreme Court noted in Vu, part of the privacy problem
with devices is that they are often networked or connected to the internet, which
expands the scope of what can be searched. The cell phone or computer of a
traveller at the airport, then, might have apps containing banking information,
or which allow access to social media accounts, streamed software tools or other
cloud-stored data. Importantly, the data itself may actually be located in another
country, and by searching too obtrusively the CBSA official might be engaged in
gathering evidence from the other state. As innocuous as it seems to the eye, this
is a major point of contention in international law enforcement circles,98 since
98 See generally Robert J. Currie, ‘‘Cross-Border Evidence Gathering in Transnational
Criminal Investigation: Is Microsoft Ireland the ‘Next Frontier’”? (forthcoming);
Bertrand de la Chapelle & Paul Fehlinger, Jurisdiction on the Internet: From Legal Arms
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there is a solid prohibition of cross-border evidence-gathering under customary
international law which is taken very seriously by governments around the
world.99 Restricting the scope of the search can at least help Canadian officials
avoid this problem—and this is easily accomplished by simply disabling the
device’s access to the internet prior to the search beginning, which limits the
search to data that is actually stored on the device.
Finally, in Fearon the court underscored the importance of after-the-fact
review of such searches where they turn up evidence of an offence, due to the fact
that ‘‘we are dealing here with an extraordinary search power that requires
neither a warrant nor reasonable and probable grounds.”100 ‘‘[A]s a
constitutional imperative,” Cromwell J. required the police to keep ‘‘detailed
notes of what they have examined,” which ‘‘should generally include ‘‘the
applications searched, the extent of the search, the time of the search, its purpose
and duration.”101 This seems entirely suited to the border device search setting,
since the same ‘‘constitutional imperative” is present. Notes can be kept with
reasonable ease by the CBSA officer conducting the secondary search; in fact,
there might be technological solutions to keep the search efficient, such as by
hooking the phone to computer software that records the details of the search, or
even something as simple as a video recording of the search102 (which could itself
be done on something as portable as a smart phone).
While the foregoing framework may not be perfect, it is at least a starting
point on the path towards accommodating the new ‘‘digital reality” that
confronts Canadian society at the border, which thus far has gone undisturbed
by thorough Charter analysis. It is, however, a fairly modest proposal,
acknowledging the importance of the state’s interest in border security and
Race to Transnational Cooperation, Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper
Series No. 28 (April 2016); Kate Westmoreland and Gail Kent, ‘‘Foreign Law
Enforcement Access to User Data: A Survival Guide and Call For Action” (2015) 13:2
Canadian JL & Technology 225; Bert-Jaap Koops &Morag Goodwin, Cyberspace, the
cloud and cross-border criminal investigation: The limits and possibilities of international
law (Tilburg: Tilburg University, 2014); Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY),
Transborder access and jurisdiction:What are the options? (6 December 2012), Doc no T-
CY (2012). Courts are beginning to acknowledge this issue; see Riley, supra note 33 at
2491.
99 TheU.S. andU.K. are currently seeking to create a treaty to address this issue; see Ellen
Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, ‘‘The British want to come to America—with wiretap




100 Fearon, supra note 10 at para. 82.
101 Ibid.
102 Nader Hasan has proposed this as a means of enhancing the after-the-fact review of
searches incident to arrest, noting that it is a means to ensure the search is narrowly
tailored and may, in fact, be ‘‘less cumbersome and less time-consuming than requiring
officers to capture the same information in their notes” (Hasan, supra note 9 at 472).
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integrity, which after all is of pressing concern to Canadians. In essence, it simply
applies the standard of reasonable suspicion (which already attaches to most
customs searches) to all searches of electronic devices on the person or in the
custody of people crossing the border, and provides that the search can only be
of limited scope and duration. It is fairly close to CBSA’s current practices, but is
probably superior in that it ensures that this invasive kind of search is authorized
by law and underpinned by actual grounds to believe something is awry; random
searches of devices should not be permitted, just as random searches of our
houses and body cavities are not permitted.
III. UNLOCK THIS! COMPELLING PASSWORDS
Having proposed a framework for the legality of device searches at the
border, it is worth considering the main issue in the Philippon case: could the
accused be compelled to unlock his phone? Recall that this is the main issue
because Philippon was charged, under section 153.1(b) of the Customs Act, that
he ‘‘hinder[ed] or prevent[ed] an officer from doing anything that the officer is
authorized to do under” the Act. For the purpose of argument, I will assume that
the CBSA officer in question had a reasonable suspicion that grounded the
search of Philippon’s cell phone (though no facts of that nature emerge from the
media coverage), and thus that the section 8 framework suggested above was
complied with. Even if the search was lawful, however, Philippon is only guilty of
‘‘hindering or preventing” if the CBSA officer was authorized to compel the
phone’s password, and if Philippon had a legal duty to do anything beyond
refusing to provide the password.
By way of background, it is worth remembering that the Customs Act
imposes a number of duties on individuals to do things that would facilitate their
scrutiny by CBSA agents. In particular, sections 11 and 13 require people to
submit to questions, answer the questions honestly, and with regard to imported
goods that have been reported as such, to, ‘‘if an officer so requests, present the
goods to the officer, remove any covering from the goods. . .or open or unpack
any package or container that the officer wishes to examine” (section 13(b)). As
the known facts of the Philippon case demonstrate, CBSA appears to have used
these provisions (or some part of the Customs Act) as authority for demanding
that people unlock their password-protected devices. The case is reminiscent of
Whittaker, where the CBSA official told the accused he was required to provide
passwords for his computers or else be arrested for ‘‘hindering a CBSA officer in
the execution of his duties,” and the computer would be sent ‘‘to CBSA experts
to search.”103 It is important, then, that these are first-level ‘‘routine” searches
103 Whittaker, supra note 44 at para. 4. The assumption here is that section 13 is being used
by CBSA as the authority for compelling individuals to unlock the device. Section 11
requires individuals to answer questions honestly, but appears to be oriented towards
acquiring information. Section 11 does not seem geared towards the question ‘‘What is
the password to your computer?” which is truly directed at facilitating the search rather
than acquiring information.
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under section 99(1), since the reasoning being used by CBSA appears to be as
follows: section 13 requires individuals to facilitate the search of any ‘‘goods”
that a CBSA official wishes to inspect; a device is a ‘‘good;” in order to inspect a
password-locked device the officer must have the password; therefore the
individual is required to provide the password. There appears to be no similar
requirement attached to the searches in the Act that proceed explicitly on the
basis of reasonable suspicion.
The question, of course, is whether this reasoning holds up, since the idea of
being compelled to help the state find evidence against you smacks strongly of a
violation of the principle against self-incrimination. This argument was made in
Buss, where the accused voluntarily gave up the passwords to his phone and
computer, but claimed that his right to be free from self-incrimination under
section 7 of the Charter had been infringed. The court tersely dismissed this
argument on the basis that a routine search in the border context did not amount
to a detention or trigger any Charter rights arising therefrom.104
Is this constitutionally satisfactory? A great deal depends, in my view, on
what is being searched. Traditionally, this regime permits a CBSA agent who has
formed the desire to search someone’s luggage, briefcase or wallet—and
therefore has likely begun a secondary inspection—to simply ask the
individual to open the suitcase, briefcase or wallet. No doubt on a daily basis
such inspections reveal problems that get people charged or arrested, whether for
items on which duty was not paid, animal parts, drugs or anything else which an
individual might have and/or be trying to smuggle into Canada. We know from
Jarvis105 that compelling individuals to facilitate warrantless searches for
regulatory purposes is Charter-compliant up to the point at which penal
jeopardy is engaged. The regulatory purpose, screening people and items at the
border, is an important one and routine searches are a part of it. So long as the
process shifts to a proper criminal investigation once the contraband is found, it
might be argued, then compelling the unlocking of the phone is consistent with
that regulatory purpose. If a cell phone is indeed a ‘‘good,” and no different from
a briefcase, then while section 13 of the Customs Act is a bit unspecific, it may be
reasonably good authority to compel the password. On this reasoning, Philippon
may be guilty.
As has been argued above, however, a device is not like a briefcase. The
Supreme Court stated clearly in Vu that a computer is not like a filing cabinet,106
which obviously means it is not like a briefcase or suitcase either. I have
suggested above that the intense informational privacy interest in devices
necessitates the formation of reasonable suspicion to ground a cursory search of
a device at the border. By ‘‘reasonable suspicion” is meant ‘‘reasonable suspicion
104 Buss, supra note 42 at paras. 32-35.
105 R. v. Jarvis, 2002 CarswellAlta 1440, 2002 CarswellAlta 1441, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757
(S.C.C.).
106 Vu, supra note 10 at paras. 24, 44.
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that the individual has contraband or illegal material, or is breaking or has
broken some criminal or quasi-criminal law, grounded on objectively reasonable
facts.” Searches of devices should not be permitted randomly or on the basis of
some mild suspicion, curiosity or personal whim on the part of a CBSA agent.
From a statutory interpretation point of view, then, the term ‘‘goods” should
not be interpreted as including devices. Section 13 explicitly applies to imported
goods, and as argued above a device carried with an individual is no more an
‘‘imported good” than a pair of shoes that one wears on a business trip or
vacation. Also, section 13 only applies to ‘‘imported goods” which have been
reported as such under section 12. Just as one does not report one’s shoes as
‘‘imported goods,” one does not report one’s personal device as an imported
good.107 Section 99.3(1), which allows a non-intrusive search of goods in a
person’s custody or possession, contains no language compelling the individual
to open or unpack the goods. Accordingly, a duty to facilitate inspection of
‘‘imported goods” may not apply at all.
If any of this is correct, then while the state may be empowered to search the
device, there is no corresponding power to compel the individual to facilitate the
search. As the Supreme Court stated in R. v. Mann, ‘‘Absent a law to the
contrary, individuals are free to do as they please. By contrast, the police (and
more broadly, the state) may act only to the extent that they are empowered to
do so by law.”108 Accordingly, if the police come to my house with a search
warrant and I refuse to unlock the door, they may indeed batter down the door
and enter the house, since a court has given them authority to do so, but they
may not compel me to unlock the door. Similarly, if CBSA has the authority to
search my phone or computer, they can probably seize it, utilize whatever
software or forensic means are necessary to ‘‘crack” the password and do the
search—but they cannot compel me to unlock it.
A demand for the password, so that the CBSA agent can unlock it him/
herself, would have the same effect and would even more directly infringe the
principle against self-incrimination. Unless a Charter caution was read and the
accused voluntarily gave up his right to remain silent and agreed to facilitate the
investigation, this would simply be a conscripted statement and in breach of
section 7.109 By comparison, even in the context of an otherwise lawful
investigative detention, an individual does not have to answer questions.110
107 Possibly excepting the situation where one bought the device in the foreign state from
which one is coming.
108 R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, 2004 CarswellMan 303, 2004 CarswellMan 304 (S.C.C.) at
para. 15.
109 CarissimaMathen, ‘‘Section 7 and the Criminal Law” inMendes & Beaulac, supra note
48 at 715-716. I emphasize that this is an argument and that this question, to the limited
extent it has comeup thus far, is unsettled. InR. c. Boudreau-Fontaine, 2010QCCA1108,
2010 CarswellQue 5672, 2010 CarswellQue 15139 (C.A. Que.) Doyon J.A. held that a
target cannot be compelled to produce passwords under a search warrant, as this would
violate the principle against self-incrimination (para. 39).My research has not uncovered
similar findings elsewhere in Canada, however. The English Court of Appeal has held
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The argument might be raised that this slightly more restrictive
interpretation will create unnecessary mischief and deprive the state of an
important border screening power, since individuals would simply refuse to
unlock their device or provide the password and (at least potentially) escape scot-
free with whatever contraband or evidence is on their device. This should not be
a large concern, however. What is proposed is that CBSA officials may not
search a device until they have formed a reasonable suspicion about its contents.
At that point, as argued above, they have the legal authority to do a cursory
search, and they can likely continue their current practice of telling the individual
that either he/she can unlock the phone or it can be taken away and searched.
The latter option is likely to be time-consuming and presumably most people
would voluntarily unlock the device and submit to the cursory search rather than
be deprived of it.
What would be unacceptable, however, would be an individual facing
conviction under section 153.1 of ‘‘hindering or preventing” a CBSA officer’s
duties based on their refusal to do something that the state has no power to
compel them to do. On this argument, then, Alain Philippon could not be found
guilty of the offence with which he is charged.
IV. CONCLUSION
The protection and security of Canada’s borders engages a set of public
interests that are quite distinct from those involved in the day-to-day life of
Canadians within those borders, and which interact uneasily with the protection
of personal privacy under section 8 of the Charter. While there is jurisprudence
on these matters, the Supreme Court’s recent case law on the protection of
privacy in electronic devices has not yet seen any significant consideration in the
border context. Given the incredible permeation of our lives by devices it is
inevitable that such consideration will happen, because it is needed; the intense
media interest in the case of Alain Philippon tells us that, even if it tells us
nothing else.
The central argument of this article, however, has been that the Philippon
case does indeed tell us something else, in particular because it provides a solid
that an encryption key ‘‘exists separately from each defendant’s will,” and thus is neutral
and non-incriminating: R. v. S. (F.), [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1489,
and see discussion of the overall U.K. position in Andrew L-T Choo, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination andCriminal Justice (Portland,OR:Hart Publishing, 2013) at
pp. 46-50. The situation in the U.S. is mixed, but one court has found that device
passcodes were testimonial in nature and thus subject to self-incrimination protections:
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bonan Huang et al., Civil Case No. 15-269
(September 23, 2015, E.D. Pa.). However, another court was prepared to find the
password to be simply analogous to a lock on a suitcase, in the border context: United
States v. McAuley, 563 F.Supp.2d 672 (W.D. Texas, 2008).
110 R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, 2009 CarswellOnt 4106, 2009 CarswellOnt 4107 (S.C.C.) at
paras. 27-29.
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platform for considering: 1) under what conditions can CBSA officials search
devices as part of normal screening procedures (and outside the standard
warranted search in a criminal investigation)?; and 2) does an individual subject
to such a search have to unlock a password-protected device in order to facilitate
it? The best answer to the first question, I have argued here, is arrived at by
subjecting the first-level border search to the established section 8 jurisprudence
and adapting it conservatively but appropriately. Accordingly:
– individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
their devices and therefore the routine first-level inspection is nonetheless
a ‘‘search” and section 8 applies;
– the first-level inspection is authorized by law, specifically the Customs Act,
but the invocation of section 99(1)(a) by the Crown and the courts may be
an error in statutory interpretation, and section 99.3(1) is the more
appropriate authority;
– in any event, the law will only be reasonable where the search is carried
out on the basis that the official has reasonable grounds to suspect that the
device contains illegal material or evidence of an offence;
– the search will also only be executed reasonably if carried out analogously
to the search incident to arrest standards from Fearon, i.e. that it includes
only sent and draft emails and texts, photos, call logs, note-taking and
anything similar. Detailed notes—or perhaps even a video-recording—-
should be taken of the search. Officials should be careful to avoid
searching items/apps that will obviously access cloud-stored data,
probably by disabling the device’s internet access functionality.
This article has been focused on Canadian law and has not engaged
significantly with the American jurisprudence on point. However, as it was being
finalized a U.S. case emerged that employs a similar methodology to the one
proposed here. In the 3 June 2016 decision in U.S. v. Ramos,111 the accused had
his cell phone searched after being arrested for drug trafficking at the border, and
challenged the search on the basis that a warrant was required. District Court
Judge Miller attempted to rationalize recent case law regarding device and
border searches, in particular the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley112
which highlighted a heightened level of privacy in devices and their data in a
manner similar to that of the Supreme Court of Canada. In deciding that a
standard of reasonable suspicion should apply to all searches of cell phones at
the border, Judge Miller stated:
Adopting the reasonable suspicion standard currently used only for
forensic examinations of digital devices, see Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968,
as the standard for all border searches of cell phones, may be a prudent
way to harmonize Riley’s concerns with the salutary border search
111 — F.Supp. 3d —, 2016 WL 3552140 (U.S. Cal. D., 2016). I am grateful to Professor
Norman Abrams for bringing this case to my attention.
112 Riley, supra, note 34.
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principles. First, the privacy interests involved in searches of modern
cell phones are present both during manual and forensic searches.
While a forensic examination is more intrusive, a manual search of a
modern cell phone certainly exposes the same type of information
discussed in Riley — messages, photos, contacts list, call logs, etc. —
both in isolated form and in combination. Accordingly, a manual
search can be just as invasive as a full forensic examination. . .
Second, current Ninth Circuit law on border searches requires no
suspicion at all for manual searches of cell phones. . .Riley’s threshold
recognition that cell phone searches are inevitably intrusive suggests the
concept of a “routine” cell phone search provides little guidance to law
enforcement officials and courts.
Finally, from the practical point of view, reasonable suspicion
represents a workable standard, as it would allow customs officials to
predictably do their job while affording a heightened level of privacy
protection suggested by Riley. According to the Department of
Homeland Security, “officers very likely do have reasonable suspicion
in most searches of electronic devices based on existing screening
methods and objective factors.” See Thomas Mann Miller, Digital
Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 1943, 1996
(2015), citing Government Data Regarding Electronic Device Searches,
ACLU. Thus, requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic and manual
searches would likely impose only minimal burdens on customs
officials’ current methods.113
On the second question, the only authority apparent in the Customs Act for
compelling individuals to unlock their devices to facilitate inspection is section
13, which is explicitly about ‘‘imported goods” that have been reported as being
imported under section 12. It is highly doubtful whether a device can be properly
interpreted as coming within the definition of either ‘‘goods” or certainly
‘‘imported goods.” There is therefore no statutory requirement to unlock the
device, and any purported common law power would appear to be
unconstitutional. Accordingly, individuals are not required to provide
passwords or otherwise unlock devices in order to facilitate a search.
In the end, if this argument is correct or even moves in the right direction,
one thing it points to is the need to reconsider and re-draft the Customs Act. The
issue of how electronic devices should be treated at the border demonstrates that
the piecemeal amendments that the Act has seen over previous decades are not
sufficient for current purposes, as its language is becoming increasingly
antiquated. As regards the search provisions, in particular, revision in line
with an understanding of technological realities and current constitutional norms
is probably overdue.
113 Ibid.
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POSTSCRIPT
As this article was going to press, a number of developments emerged which
should be flagged, even though it was too late to incorporate them into the
overall article. First, to the disappointment of a number of criminal lawyers who
were watching the case (including the present author), Alain Philippon pleaded
guilty to the Customs Act charge and received a fine of $500.00.114 In the agreed
statement of facts underpinning the plea, it was noted that when he was stopped
at the airport, Philippon had two cell phones and $5,000.00 in cash, and there
were traces of cocaine on his luggage. Under the analytical framework I have
proposed here, these facts would certainly have provided a reasonable suspicion
justifying a cursory search—and, in fact, CBSA indicated that they were still
retaining the phone.115 However, even if that search framework is correct, the
question of compelling the password will have to await a future case.
Or will it? In August 2016 the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
proposed that Parliament pass a new law that would compel people to disclose
their passwords or encryption keys to police, once judicial authorization was
obtained.116 The proposal saw robust public debate, and not unexpectedly it has
been criticized as overly corrosive of individual privacy.117 However, the most
interesting point was the concession by RCMP Assistant Commissioner Joe
Oliver that ‘‘[t]here is nothing currently in Canadian law that would compel
someone to provide a password to police during an investigation.”118 This
certainly makes it more doubtful that CBSA has the corresponding power in
first-level border searches.
In fact, it appears that the CBSA itself is in some disarray on this issue. Also
in August 2016, in an article touching on the Philippon case, the British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) revealed the contents of freedom
of information requests that had obtained various operational information from
CBSA.119 This included statements to the effect that CBSA felt it had the
authority to compel passwords, but acknowledged that the law on point was not
114 Brett Ruskin, ‘‘Alain Philippon pleads guilty over smartphone password border
dispute,”CBCNews (15 August 2016) online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-
scotia/alain-philippon-to-plead-guilty-cellphone-1.3721110>.
115 Ibid.
116 ‘‘Police chiefs want law that would force people to reveal passwords,” The Globe &Mail
(16 August 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/police-
chiefs-want-law-that-would-compel-people-to-reveal-passwords/article31428735/>.
117 See, e.g., Nader Hasan & Stephen Aylward, ‘‘Password protection a crucial Charter
right,” Toronto Star (23 August 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/
commentary/2016/08/23/password-protection-a-crucial-charter-right.html>.
118 Supra note 116.
119 Micheal Vonn, ‘‘What Happens If You Don’t Provide Your Cellphone Password to
BorderAgents?”, BritishColumbiaCivil Liberties Association (25August 2016), online:
<https://bccla.org/2016/08/what-happens-if-you-dont-provide-your-cellphone-pass-
word-to-border-agents/>.
320 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [14 C.J.L.T.]
clear. Moreover, as of 25 June 2015 CBSA officials were instructed not to charge
anyone under s. 153.1 of the Customs Act for failing to surrender a password,
until the law was clarified ‘‘in ongoing court proceedings” (apparently a reference
to the Philippon case itself).120
All of this suggests two things. First, it provides support for the argument
made here that compelling passwords in customs searches is not permitted under
Canadian law as it stands. Second, as encryption technology becomes more
advanced and makes it difficult for law enforcement to forensically ‘‘crack”
devices that they have lawful authority to search, the state will increasingly seek
powers to compel individuals to cooperate and unlock the devices. The extent to
which privacy will be traded away to facilitate law enforcement in this setting
will, as always, bear watching.
120 Ibid. It is worth noting that the information also revealed that CBSA agents were under
instructions to limit their searches to the contents of the devices themselves and avoid
viewing or obtaining any data byway of internet connection. This is a salutary limitation
which comports with the search limits I proposed in section 3(c)(iv), above.
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